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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Governance in Action in the Life Sciences: Some Lessons for Policy 
Catherine Lyall, Theo Papaioannou and James Smith 
 
Introduction 
This book set out to question conventional notions of governance in response to calls 
for more critical debate and guidance on its application in specific policy areas such as 
the life sciences. Our characterisation of ‘governance’ has been broadly that of an 
increased role of non-government actors in policy-making through various participatory 
networks and mechanisms. In foregrounding governance as an inherently political 
process, concerned with articulating different actors’ interests, values and beliefs, we 
have also aimed at a more nuanced understanding of what ‘governance’ means and how 
it might be practised.  
This book has engaged with the core problem that the life sciences do still require 
a considerable degree of conventional command and control style regulation. Many of 
the complicating factors identified in the application of the governance agenda to 
science and innovation-related issues arise from complex interactions between this still-
necessary, government-based regulation and the more participative forms of policy-
making that are being fostered both to promote national competitiveness and encourage 
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public acceptance of these new technologies. We have argued that there are actually 
limits to the all pervasive notion of ‘governance’ and that, instead, the multi-faceted 
policy and regulatory situation that applies to genomics and the life sciences more 
generally requires the existence of some form of a government-governance continuum 
or synchrony.  
The preceding chapters have considered the application of some of the ‘new tools 
of governance’ to the life sciences from ethical, political, legal, social and policy 
perspectives and through a mix of theoretical, empirical and case study analyses. 
Despite the political (and academic) rhetoric about new governance approaches, our 
analysis highlights the enduring capacity of the state (in the North at least) to control 
and also to frame debates about new technology – hence ‘the limits to governance’.  
 It would be expedient to suggest that, because we are dealing with the life 
sciences, concerns of biosafety and regulation necessarily keep the focus on government 
unlike other areas of policy. But this offers an overly simplistic interpretation of the 
issues. In fact, what this book demonstrates is a complex set of relationships between 
government and governance which influence all areas of science and innovation policy. 
This is the answer to Jordan et al. (2005) who ask whether governance has eclipsed 
government in the context of specific policy instruments and point to the need to move 
‘beyond theorising and conduct more detailed empirical testing’. In exploring how these 
new tools of governance might apply to the life sciences we have attempted to lift the 
debate from the realms of theory and rhetoric to examine real cases of governance in 
action. 
This argument travels and our examples have sought to broaden out from the 
Westminster model.  The cases discussed in the preceding chapters have ranged across 
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continents (Europe, Africa, Asia and America) and traversed multiple levels of 
governance including the national, international and supra-national.  Authors in this 
book have examined legal instruments, regulatory systems, international conventions 
and research initiatives.  Our thinking has been guided by a tripartite organising frame 
consisting of principles, processes and people.  In discussing the principles of 
governance in the life sciences we have examined our conceptions of, and 
commentaries on, government and governance; how these are established; the role of 
justice and values, and the management of morality. We next examined some of the 
processes involved, both those that are well-established (such as the regulation of drug 
innovation in the US) and those that are in transition in southern African countries, as 
well as how processes translate across nations. Finally, we focused on people; which 
actors are involved in governance processes and what limits their involvement.  
The Limits to Governance 
Whilst it might be editorially convenient to think of government in terms of outputs 
(such as legal instruments) and governance as the process by which such outputs may 
be derived, we recognise that governance is indeed a slippery concept with multiple 
meanings and interpretations (Chapter 1).  This presents difficulties around how and 
when it can be differentiated from traditional government perspectives. Coupled with 
this, there are well-articulated concerns that the move from government to governance 
presents problems of accountability and transparency: governance networks can, in 
practice, reduce open democratic debate (for example, Greenaway et al. 2007). 
While it is common for the literature on governance to explore whether the 
informal authority of networks has supplanted the formal authority of government, we 
have turned this discussion on the ‘limits to the state’ (Rhodes 2007) into a question 
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about what limits governance. We have suggested that the policy and regulatory 
situation that applies to the life sciences presents a government/governance paradox.  
We have argued throughout the book for the existence of some form of government-
governance continuum.  This is not to resort to a simplified, linear dichotomy where the 
characterisation of any one policy situation is either ‘government’ or ‘governance’ but 
rather a duality or co-existence of the two in some measure – the ability to exist in a 
sense as both at any one time depending on the particular policy situation. Indeed even 
one of the main protagonists of the ‘hollowing out of the state’ now concedes that ‘the 
traditional instruments of government co-mingle, compete and conflict with the new 
instruments of governance to variable effect’ (Rhodes 2007). 
We are therefore tapping into a well-rehearsed argument about the role of the state 
in governance and our argument is in line with other social and political scientists such 
as Peters and Pierre (2006, 213) who insist that ‘The state that remains in the face of 
numerous changes in governance is still a powerful actor. There may have been some 
hollowing out but when assessed more carefully we can … see that the “shell” that 
remains retains much of its real power’.   
What is novel is the focus that we have brought to bear on the life sciences in this 
debate where this apparent co-existence certainly does not always imply peaceful 
relationships. Rather it almost invariably leads to conflicts and tensions.  Identifying 
these limitations can give us a clearer idea of the nature of the co-existence in order for 
life science technologies to develop and contribute to the public good in ways that are 
generally viewed as socially acceptable. 
Arguing from both theoretical and empirical positions, the preceding chapters 
have identified a number of limits to governance.  We have seen that modern politics 
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limit the fair distribution of opportunities and risks in genomics through a complex web 
of existing institutions and a dispersed range of heterarchical networks (Papaioannou).  
And we have explored cases (Milne and Tait, Laurie et al., Harmon, Nightingale and 
McLeish, Kanellopoulou) where in each situation, to differing degrees, a ‘hard’ 
government structure was still required in order to support the additional layer of ‘soft’, 
governance intervention. We have also identified geo-political limits which mean that 
some of the northern interpretations of governance are much less applicable in 
developing country contexts (Smith, Mugwagwa); this may in turn place limits on the 
role of non-governmental actors (Harsh, Bryant).  
In highlighting the normative and empirical limitations of a governance approach 
to the life sciences, these examples of governance in action lead us to four lessons for 
policy which we now explore in more detail for the remainder of the chapter. 
Governance is Dynamic 
While the history of governance during the 20th century may appear as ‘a shifting 
balance between government and governance’ (Rhodes 2007), this should not be 
interpreted as a steady, uniform, linear progression from government to governance. 
Rhodes admits that ‘the policy networks literature in general pays too little attention to 
change’ and this is a serious omission in a fast-moving policy field such as the life 
sciences where, as we have already noted, policy and regulation often struggle to keep 
pace with the science (Tait et al. 2006, 379). 
Although the state and its institutions remain central elements in governance, the 
latter is a dynamic process that responds to constant change. As Laurie et al. point out 
(Chapter 3), in the life sciences, change does not only concern biotechnological 
innovations but also values and interests. Thus, an effective governance regime in the 
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life sciences implies the ability to anticipate and respond to both biotechnological and 
ethico-political changes. This ability depends on the mechanisms which are in place to 
engage with stakeholders throughout the life of the scientific endeavour and thereby to 
identify, map and respond to any shifting dynamics around their values and interests.  
Certainly, society has always had the task of steering its science and innovation 
activities. Before the term ‘governance’ was introduced and the model was well defined, 
steering was associated with the democratic state. However, even in that state-centric 
situation, the role of non-state actors was crucial. As Pierre and Peters (2000, 30) note, 
‘We now have better ways of identifying and conceptualising the role of non-state 
actors, but those actors were influential even before social scientists had the right words 
to capture their involvement in the process’. In the context of state-centric, democratic 
process, governance enhances or implicates certain values, and, as suggested by 
Harmon’s case study of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) (Chapter 
4), it must be continually reconsidered to ensure that those values are appropriate and 
that it is meeting them effectively. A deliberative governance process should lead to a 
more detailed and rich understanding of the policy issues and possibilities, including – 
at least in the life sciences – moral issues. To this end, political institutions and 
structures should produce a common framework of enforced rules of democracy. As 
Stoker (2006, 154) points out ‘A democratic system does not require the participation of 
all the people or all of the time; rather, its defining characteristic is its openness to all’.  
Democratic governance situations are almost always dynamic, implying not 
necessarily continuity but also breaks in the chain where, for example, a change in 
government or another ‘event’ may cause a disjuncture. Nightingale and McLeish 
(Chapter 6) illustrate this point in the case of biosecurity where global political events 
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have caused a backing away from governance measures and the reinvigoration of 
government controls. Likewise in the case of drug regulation, the Vioxx incident 
described in Chapter 1 resulted in tighter controls to prevent conflict of interest and 
ensure greater transparency, contrary to the generally de-regulatory climate.  Staying 
with drug regulation, Milne and Tait (Chapter 5) highlight a complex, dynamic 
interdependence between government controls and governance processes. Ultimately 
governance in all its forms and through all its levers, is dynamic because it represents, 
firstly, an articulation between state and society and, secondly, because it represents a 
means to articulate values, beliefs and politics. Governance, as both a process and a 
vision of how state and society ought to interrelate, profoundly reflects the dynamism of 
change in all its facets, political, economic, societal, and this dynamism is thrown into 
yet sharper relief by the challenges laid before us by the life sciences. Capturing this 
dynamism is precisely what governance – as an effective policy process – should be 
doing.  But, what many of the chapters have demonstrated, is that this remains both 
problematic and increasingly necessary. 
Governance is Context Dependent 
Recognising that new technologies in themselves shape (and are shaped by) the ethico-
political context in which they are developed, exist and impact upon society, Smith 
(Chapter 7) examines the shifting context of science policy in development countries 
and reflects on what ‘governance’ actually means in the context of new bio-scientific 
technologies, weakening states and multiple, complex external dynamics. Many of the 
constructs and terms we rely on to describe and explain the governance of the 
biosciences in more developed countries are therefore much less precisely understood in 
the context of developing countries. Governance has its own genealogy in Africa and in 
386 
Europe. Yet the critiques surrounding governance, participation and NGOs in the North 
and South are similar.  
The chapters by Mugwagwa, Harsh and Bryant explore the nature and limits of 
governance in these contexts where coordination and harmonisation of governance 
remain firmly centred on the state. As we have seen, using the example of biosafety 
policy processes in southern Africa, Mugwagwa (Chapter 8) brings to the fore some of 
the realities that technology governance faces in a developing country setting, making a 
case for multi-pronged approaches, including a return to government, even in an era 
where governments are generally agreed to be playing a receding role.   
Harsh (Chapter10), on the other hand, addresses another paradox.  While 
discussions of new modes of governance create expectations and obfuscate the politics 
inherent in choices about biotechnology, he argues that, despite greater involvement of 
NGOs in the governance of biotechnology, decisions about developing biotechnologies 
are generally not more democratic or accountable. The addition of NGOs as another 
type of development actor has often made projects less democratic. Whereas the state’s 
power in Europe may be eroding in a shift to governance, states in Africa have never 
had as much direct control of decisions. Harsh concludes that there is almost surely 
more room for the state and for government in the realm of biotechnology in Africa.  
Harsh’s conclusion provides an empirically grounded backing to one of the most 
critical arguments against governance; namely that discussions of governance create a 
misleadingly consensual picture of decision-making, even though there can be 
significant issues surrounding access, legitimacy and accountability. The problem, as 
Pierre and Peters (2000, 67) put it, is that governance often invites politically 
illegitimate and non-accountable actors into the processes of steering. Even if the 
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intention is to maintain lines of legitimacy and accountability, the complexity of the 
merging relationships between the state and non-state actors may make it difficult for 
citizens to understand how legitimacy and accountability function (ibid).  
In some developing countries, of course, state actors are virtually absent. 
Therefore, governance gradually takes the place of weak or non-existent government 
and regulatory frameworks. In some other developing countries, government and the 
state facilitate decision-making through governance. The case of Mali (Bryant, Chapter 
11) demonstrates an example of decision-making in action and allows us to ask 
questions about who should be involved in decision-making of this sort, and how real 
dialogue between scientists and citizens can be promoted in order to build better 
agricultural technologies for Africa’s producers and consumers.  
In arguing that governance is context-dependent we also acknowledge that, in 
practice, it can effectively be organised to operate independently or parallel to context, 
purposefully or not. Several of the chapters that focused on the governance of life 
sciences in developing countries highlighted the absence, retreat or weakness of the 
state. This can create spaces in which ‘governance’ processes may occur in parallel or 
apart from the state. Issues of scale and scope, both geographical and political, serve to 
embed or remove governance from its context. Several chapters highlight that the more 
‘successful’ governance processes took place where context was more fully understood 
and engaged with. There is thus a need to understand how better to use governance to 
broaden decision-making with and within weaker states in order to bolster their poorer 
array of options, resources and policy instruments. There is a corresponding need to 
understand the politics and power of the governance process itself; it may be shaped by 
contexts but it also shapes contexts. 
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Governance is Political  
The choice of policy tools reflects political and cultural norms (Chapter 1) and it is 
generally the case that the political sensitivity of the life sciences requires strong, direct 
governmental control rather than self-regulation. Although networks seem to play an 
important role in the steering of life sciences innovation, and wider stakeholder and 
public engagement inevitably leads to demands to bring a range of broader interests and 
values into consideration in these decisions, this process does not take away the need for 
political judgements about the direction to be taken.  Such policy decisions are 
ostensibly science-based but have always been influenced by interests and values. The 
concept of governance has historically emerged from within the very concept of 
government. Therefore, by definition, governance is political.   
Specifically, when it comes to aggregate political issues such as social justice, 
political judgements are presupposed of policy-making. Governance models need to 
address the normative and empirical limits of self-organisation and chaotic networking, 
opening the way for a plausible institutional response based on politically developed 
principles of distributive justice (Papaioannou, Chapter 2).  
Harsh (Chapter 10) and Bryant (Chapter 11) argue that governance may both 
embody politics (as in the case of the highly politicised and politically-funded NGOs 
Harsh encountered in Kenya) and provide a means to resist powerful international 
political forces and engage with them locally – as the case of Mali illustrates. These 
cases represent different slices of politics and its relationship to decision-making and 
stand in opposition to the notion of processes and intermediaries as somehow apolitical 
and interested only in development which is very apparent in discourses regarding the 
role of science, and the life sciences, in economic, social and political development. 
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As Laurie et al. have argued (Chapter 3), one way to improve governance models 
and the experience of those stakeholders involved and affected is through the 
incorporation of mechanisms that make explicit the value-positions that inform and are 
supported by decisions or policies, and the articulation of reasons for these decisions or 
policies as they impact on the governance of the life sciences. However, another way to 
improve governance in specific areas of the life sciences is to bring back government 
command and control. Indeed, Nightingale and McLeish (Chapter 6) demonstrate a 
return to government: a re-emergence of state-centric security measures.  In the 
politically sensitive area of biosecurity policy, rather than a reduction in traditional hard 
security and an incorporation of ‘new security challenges’, we have seen an expansion 
of hard security as nation states expand the scope of coercive control and implement 
new security legislation. The changes in biosecurity policy and its increasing interaction 
with science policy outlined in Chapter 6 highlight the limits of ‘governance’ as a 
theoretical concept. It is certainly true that recent changes in biosecurity policy can be 
easily fitted into a governance framework, but Nightingale and McLeish’s more detailed 
analysis highlights both major anomalies and more convincing explanations. While the 
implementation of new biosecurity measures has involved a degree of self-regulation 
this does not amount to a shift away from the state to public participation in governance. 
We stated at the start of this chapter that we were aiming to achieve a more 
nuanced understanding of what ‘governance’ means and how it might be practised. 
Central to this is an acknowledgement that there is no ‘most appropriate’ mix of 
governance or ‘blend’ of policy tools as we discussed in Chapter 1. Instead, there is a 
constant ebb and flow and a shifting frontier between government and governance and a 
constant reconfiguration of the roles and limits of modalities of governance. 
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Governance, through its complexity and binding to context, reflects politics broadly-
writ and in doing so reflects multiple contexts and perspectives, dynamism and change, 
in terms of what it articulates and how it ought to be practised. What is clear is that 
governance engages politically at multiple levels and in multiple ways. 
Governance Cannot Stand Alone 
Whatever way society chooses to steer the new life sciences, one thing is evident: 
governance cannot stand alone. Whether practised as an intimate engagement with the 
state, that may indeed call for a stronger state (Milne and Tait, Chapter 5) or performed 
as a series of parallel, external activities more closely linked to markets, innovation or 
R&D (Smith, Chapter 7), successful governance processes require engagement with 
government and the political state.  Where this engagement takes place reflects the 
decision-making process, what decision is to be made, and who has the power and 
authority to make that decision. Informal governance processes do not always need to 
recognise national boundaries and can connect together new interest groups and 
interested parties in new ways. In part this reflects the particular nature of the life 
sciences and the benefits, risks and values it encompasses, in part it represents an 
increasingly globalised means of engaging with policy but ultimately it reflects the 
propelling need to engage with government. 
Milne and Tait (Chapter 5) illustrate very clearly the necessity to foster 
innovation, but also to control risk when governing the life sciences. While the 
scientific complexity and public unease with new healthcare technologies typically 
proscribe industry self-regulation, overly burdensome regulatory regimes can thwart the 
speed of innovation and limit the number, dynamism and diversity of innovators 
necessary for a high-tech field to sustain itself. The premise of their chapter is that the 
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US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has two programmes, the orphan product and 
fast track programmes for the development of new medicines, which serve as useful 
models of a regulatory system evolving towards a governance approach. These 
programmes evince certain characteristics associated with governance such as push-pull 
incentives and a problem-solving philosophy, but also demonstrate features of old-style 
command-and-control government, but with more control and less command. The 
authors suggest that these kinds of programmes have applications across a spectrum of 
different economies and technologies by combining industry incentives, increased 
government intervention, and stakeholder inclusiveness in an efficient approach that is 
not contrary to a governance agenda. Despite the tensions between the promotional role 
of a regulatory agency under governance and its public health oversight role under 
government, this evolved approach is only limited by the willingness of government to 
cede control in proportion to the willingness of industry to cede corporate self-interest 
and of public stakeholders to agree on public health priorities. 
The paradox in this chapter is that, although more rather than less intervention 
from the top down is brought to bear, it is of a complicit rather than compelling nature, 
facilitating problem solving between policy targets and policy makers. Hence there is 
‘more control, but less command’.  Milne and Tait argue that the orphan and fast track 
are exemplars of government programmes that function as governance tools at the 
regulatory system level. Combining industry incentives, increased government 
intervention, and stakeholder inclusiveness can be an efficient approach for promoting 
science and innovation that is not contrary to a governance agenda of encouraging both 
private sector investment and public engagement in a common goal. Thus we see a 
pragmatic example of a positive combination of government and governance 
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approaches although the authors acknowledge that there is a limit to the utility of this 
model, that limit in essence is framed by the bargain that how much control the 
government can give up is in direct proportion to how much self-interest the governed 
are willing to give up. 
Several authors demonstrate why the challenges of this ‘new governance’ of 
science and innovation lie less in the philosophy of the approach but more in its 
execution.  Laurie et al. (Chapter 3) add a further layer of analysis in their chapter which 
is the particular role played by interests and values within the rubric of new governance 
regimes. They describe how the UK Biobank has combined ‘hard’ government in terms 
of protecting the interests of participants as well as ‘soft’ governance taking into 
account different values and interests and ensuring continuing participation by members 
of the public in the biobank and its governance processes. Describing this as the 
‘Ethics+ approach’, where the governance regime has been developed over and above 
existing regulation, they illustrate the way in which government and governance are not 
functioning as two poles of a continuum nor as two completely intertwined entities, but 
as a ‘soft’ wrapping of governance around a ‘hard’ core of government. These authors 
conclude that, while it is ‘inconceivable’ that government alone would provide a 
sufficient basis for the establishment of the biobank, equally the legislative framework 
was required to provide a layer of protection to participants without which trust in the 
biobank would be unlikely to be gained.  
Other authors suggest a combination of deliberative governance and political 
(joined-up) government as a good solution to the problem of effective (both fair and 
problem-solving) steering of new life sciences innovation (Papaioannou, Chapter 2). 
This solution presupposes the democratic involvement of the life sciences. Government 
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and the political state can provide the framework within which deliberation can be 
realised. To some extent, this has already been happening. For example, the 
involvement of patient advocacy groups in funding, facilitation and management 
decisions on biomedical and genomic research is on the increase.  This increase is 
coupled with the creation of innovative modes of governance, such as group 
management of collective resources (such as tissue banks and databases), contractual 
agreements, influence on research direction, and intellectual property solutions.  But 
these developments still leave open questions for law and regulation to develop 
interactive but also hierarchical and control-style governance approaches in genomics 
(Kanellopoulou, Chapter 9).  
Kanellopoulou highlights the necessity to develop new models of group 
protections that both meet the needs and values of non-governmental stakeholders such 
as patient advocates, but also reconcile these with the state’s ability to exert some 
degree of control over their activities. In the absence of other protections, patient 
advocates increasingly seek to negotiate contracts in gene-discovery and drug-related 
research through private written agreements. Such contractual negotiations can help to 
avoid disputes but Kanellopoulou warns of significant concerns when groups rely on 
private means to negotiate and exert substantial control over the terms of research: these 
‘self-help’ models may work in some instances but it is uncertain whether they would 
be enforced by the courts. This untested form of governance, lacking as it does an 
underlying legal (government) framework, appears to be the opposite of Laurie et al.’s 
model.  Here we have the ‘soft’ wrapping of governance without the underpinning of 
‘hard’ government and Kanellopoulou points to significant caveats about the viability of 
this stand-alone model.   
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In a similar vein, the HFEA 1990 (and 2001 Regulations) are command and 
control instruments, that nevertheless require a dynamic and ongoing balancing exercise 
which is forever being recast or reinvented as new technologies and processes come 
before the HFEA that were not envisioned when the regime was drafted.  Harmon 
(Chapter 4) thus assesses that the HFEA’s processes are an example of governance in 
action.  Harmon concludes that, although the HFEA 1990 constitutes a deliberative 
democratic exercise closer to the governance pole where both its formulative and its 
subsequent operative processes reflect many of the elements of a governance model, its 
output (a legal instrument) ultimately supports the government model. 
Mugwagwa (Chapter 8) also discusses the challenges brought to the theory and 
practice of governance by this multi-dimensional interface between a new technology, 
limited regulatory preparedness among countries and the (apparently inevitable) 
plethora of new institutions and processes to manage it. Mugwagwa’s case study shows 
that the new international institutions developed to deal with new biotechnologies in the 
context of uneven regulation in southern Africa result in more engagement with 
governments and not less. Supra-national regulatory bodies do not replace national 
decision-making processes but instead provide new avenues for engagement and 
negotiation. Governance, ostensibly meant to harmonise regulatory processes and 
policy, provides new opportunities for debate, around how harmonisation and 
institutions should be built, and exposes new contexts and perspectives and ways to 
engage with states in southern Africa. 
In underlining that governance is content-bound and political it is almost 
inevitable to also conclude that governance can only exist in relation to the state. The 
degree of reliance on the state, with government, hard law and regulation, may differ 
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through context, application and through time but it is always there. This plurality, 
which may be highly diverse, often contested and sometimes not visible or intuitive, 
forms the core of our analysis and of the focus of this book. The relationship between 
governments and governance may be fuzzy, oppositional, reinforcing or superficial, but 
it is always present and it is by understanding this relationship and its problematics that 
we seek to draw conclusions and lessons for policy from across our broad spectrum of 
perspectives and empirical studies. 
Conclusion 
According to Rhodes (2007) ‘a decentred approach treats policy advice as stories that 
enable listeners to see governance afresh’; so what then can we learn from the stories 
our authors have told? 
As outlined at the start of this chapter, we have sought to problematise 
conventional notions of governance and participatory policy networks and have 
endeavoured to reconcile them with the often contradictory but still necessary 
government controls that attempt to both ensure public safety and promote national 
competitiveness through the life science industries. All of the authors in this book have 
tried to come to terms with different forms of this government-governance duality in the 
realm of policy-making for the life sciences. This co-existence is rarely symbiotic or 
entirely equal. Rather, it is weighted in different ways depending on the context, 
political system, historical trajectory and so forth. For example, in the context of 
developed countries and under circumstances of biosafety, we have seen the balance 
shift back to government control. By contrast, in the context of developing countries 
and under circumstances of the absence of the state, the balance shifts to governance 
networks and non-governmental actors. We have seen positive, synergistic 
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combinations of the two approaches with examples of increased government regulation 
leading to better governance of innovation (Milne and Tait, Chapter 5); governance 
processes leading to legislative outputs (Harmon, Chapter 4); and a government 
framework providing the protection necessary to support a governance approach (Laurie 
et al., Chapter 3).  But we have also witnessed the enduring influence of power and 
politics, regardless of context.  
Placing government and governance at the opposite ends of a hypothetical 
continuum has forced us to consider how they exist as a duality.  We have found that 
government and governance rarely reside at opposite poles of this continuum.  Instead 
their relationship is dynamic and evolutionary. There is a shifting frontier between 
government and governance that has to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the policy context.  The cases offered as exemplars in this book 
demonstrate that this boundary is contested and fought over. This is not to conclude that 
there are no normative principles of governance of science and innovation. Rather such 
principles are ethico-political and presuppose the state in order to be implemented. 
Certainly, the more deliberative and accountable the governance of science and 
innovation is, the more value is added to existing regulations. The latter are legitimate 
frameworks of action only if they are based on values and interests democratically 
debated through governance mechanisms. The preceding chapters also demonstrate that 
such governance mechanisms have been used, albeit with mixed success, to fill gaps in 
regulatory provision. 
Chapter 1 set out some of the complicating factors involved in the application of 
the governance agenda to the life sciences, pin-pointing the challenge of how best to 
incorporate the most useful aspects of governance-based approaches and reconcile them 
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with the still necessary systems of regulation. Much has been written about public 
participation as a new tool of governance for the life sciences and there is broad 
agreement that we need new rules of engagement in the governance process for the 
diverse stakeholder groups involved (Chataway et al. 2006). How this engagement takes 
place again reflects the complexity of context and reminds us how rarely such processes 
may be applied elsewhere with any degree of success. 
Policy-makers clearly believe that governance, in the form of improved 
participation in the policy-making process, will create more confidence in the resulting 
policies and ensure more effective implementation.  But, as we have noted above, a 
focus on governance can both create a misleadingly consensual picture of decision-
making and often invite politically illegitimate and non-accountable actors into the 
processes of policy-making.  By examining some of the principles and processes of 
governance and focusing on some of the people and groups engaged in them, the 
preceding chapters go some way to debunking this 21st century myth that the challenges 
of policy-making for the new life sciences can be tackled simply by greater 
consultation.  This approach overlooks the unresolved tensions in the expectations that, 
through participatory governance, policy-makers will simultaneously engage with a 
wider range of stakeholders; increasingly base their decisions on evidence; and be able 
to reconcile conflicting views of that evidence in order to deliver both greater 
transparency of new technologies to the wider publics and greater accountability of the 
main commercial producers and users of those technologies. 
The prevailing tendency to accentuate public participation in the policy-making 
process ignores the underlying complexities – and limits – of governance. By 
398 
acknowledging some of the limitations of current governance structures that we and our 
co-authors have identified, a more creative set of alternatives may emerge.  
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